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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth District Judicial District 
Court, in and for Utah County. R. 440.l 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented to the Court of Appeals are: 
a) Whether the trial court was correct in determining that the failure of the 
plaintiffs to return the earnest money prior to filing suit required the case to be dismissed. 
Standard of review is correctness because that is a legal issue. Palmer v. Haves, 892 P.2d 
1059 (Utah. Ct. App 1995). This issue was preserved for appeal at R.516, page 19 
b) Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the defense of failure to return the 
earnest money prior to filing suit could not be waived by the defendants. Standard of review is 
correctness, Palmer v. Haves, 892 P.2d 1059 (Utah. Ct. App 1995). All factual inferences must 
be drawn in favor of the plaintiffs, Martin v. Stevens, 243 P.2d 747 (Utah 1952), however, the 
findings of fact made by the trial judge must be given great weight, Southern Title Guar. Co., v. 
Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This issue was preserved for appeal at R.516, page 
20. 
b) Whether the trial court was correct in dismissing the case with prejudice. Standard of 
review is correctness, Valley Colour. Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (Utah 1997). 
These issues were preserved for appeal at R.428. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1
 Citations to the numbered pages of the record on appeal are in the form "R. ." 
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Rule 8, U.R.C.P. 
Rulel2,U.R.C.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is a suit specific performance and damages under a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. R. 471. 
2. On, or about, October 25, 1999, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract for the sale of Plaintiffs home to Defendants. Incident to the contract, Defendants paid 
Plaintiffs $2,500.00 Earnest Money. R. 471. 
3. Defendants never purchased Plaintiffs home. R. 470. 
4. On December 2, 1999, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendants. Plaintiffs did 
not return the Earnest Money to Defendants prior to filing suit or pursuing any other remedy. R. 
470. 
5. On December 6, 1999, Defendants gave notice that they would not go through with the 
purchase and demanded return of the Earnest Money. R. 470. 
6. On March 6, 2000, Defendants filed an answer. Defendants did nol raise the failure to 
return the Earnest Money as an affirmative defense in their answer. R. 470. 
7. On April 18, 2000, counsel for the parties entered into a stipulation. Part of the 
stipulation was that Defendants would waive all objections to the timeliness of the return of the 
Earnest Money. R. 470. 
8. On May 19, 2000, Plaintiffs returned the Earnest Money, twenty-five hundred dollars 
(2,500), to Defendants and Defendants accepted the money. R. 470. 
-2-
9. Plaintiffs returned the Earnest Money in an attempt to revive or preserve their claim 
for specific performance. R. 470. 
10. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the following provision providing for 
return of the Earnest Money: "If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this 
contract or pursue other remedies available at law/' Paragraph 16. R. 470. 
11. Plaintiffs presented their case at trial on June 6, 2000, and August 29, 2000. Plaintiffs 
rested their case on August 29? 2000. R. 470. 
13. At the close of Plaintiffs case, Defendants made a motion to dismiss based upon 
Plaintiffs' failure to return Defendants' Earnest Money before filing suit. R. 470. 
14. The defendants intentionally waited to raise the defense so that they could 
ensure a dismissal with prejudice. Docketing statement of defendants filed with the 
Appellate Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case should not have been dismissed for failure to return the earnest money. 
Neither case law, nor the contract itself require the earnest money to be returned prior to 
filing the lawsuit. In fact, public policy demands that a seller be allowed to return the 
earnest money after filing suit and before entry of judgment. 
Even if the sellers should have returned the earnest money prior to filing suit the 
case should not have been dismissed for failure to do so. The purchasers failed to raise 
the defense in their answer, they stipulated to waive it and they accepted return of the 
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earnest money. Because the defense of failure to return the earnest money is an 
affirmative defense and is nothing more than a rule of procedure, it can be and was 
waived in this case. 
The trial court should not have dismissed this case with prejudice. The trial 
court's decision was based upon a technical rule of procedure and thus should have been 
dismissed without prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
FAILURE TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY PRIOR TO FILING SUIT 
DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL 
A. THE PRIOR CASES DO NOT REQUIRE A RETURN OF THE 
EARNEST MONEY PRIOR TO FILING SUIT. 
In a long line of cases, the Appellate courts of this state have held that they will 
enforce a contractual provision in a Real Estate Purchase Contract requiring a seller to 
return earnest money prior to obtaining specific performance. Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 
1059 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Dowding v. Land Funding Limited, 555 P..2d 957 (Utah 
1976); Close v. Blumenthal 354 P.2d 856 (Utah 1960); McMullin v. Shimmin, 349 P.2d 
720 (Utah 1960); Andreason v. Hansen, 335 P.2d 404 (Utah 1959). 
In Andreason, a lawyer was selling real property. When the buyer failed to 
consummate the purchase, the plaintiff attempted to obtain a money judgment on a Real 
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Estate Purchase contract. The court expressed concerns regarding the lawyers advantaged 
position, the small type used in the contract itself and other deceptive practices of the 
seller. The court concluded by holding that because the seller's "whole case is itself 
based upon an attempt to apply a fine print clause in a contract against the defendants, 
when there is no indication that they understood the situation, and every reasonable 
inference is to the contrary," the trial court should have found a technicality in the 
contract to allow the buyers to escape liability. That technicality was the failure of the 
seller to return the earnest money. Andreason at 409. 
In McMullin, the court stated that the seller "never has returned or offered to 
return the [earnest money]." McMullin at 721. The Court then states that the trial court 
dismissed the case "for failure to return or offer to return the earnest money prior to suit." 
McMullin at 721. The Court did not address what would happen if the earnest money had 
been returned after filing suit. 
Similarly, in the Close case, the court held that a seller must elect his remedy and 
"act consistently therewith." Close at 857. Close did not discuss the situation we are 
faced with here, namely, what happens if the seller returns the earnest money after filing 
suit but before the case is dismissed. 
In Dowding, the seller never returned or offered to return the earnest money to the 
buyer. Instead, the seller deposited it into court. The Court held that did not constitute a 
return of the earnest money and thus the case was properly dismissed. 
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Most recently, the Palmer case involved a situation where the earnest mone> was 
held in escrow during the entire case. The Court held that the seller could have instructed 
the escrow agent to return the money and the seller's failure to do so constituted a failure 
to return the earnest money. While a careful reading of the facts of the case seem to 
indicate that the earnest money had not been returned at any time, the case does contain 
dicta stating that the seller "had an affirmative duty to release their interest in the deposit 
money to the [purchasers] before they filed their suit for damages." Palmer at 1062. 
Thus, a careful review of the Utah cases regarding return of earnest money, does 
admittedly show some dicta that would lead one to believe that the earnest money must be 
returned prior to filing suit. The actual facts of the cases, however, seem to show that the 
earnest money was never returned or tendered even after suit was filed. Thus, the issue 
presented in this case is one of first impression. Can a seller return the earnest money 
after filing suit? 
B. THE CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE DOES NOT REQUIRE A RETURN 
OF THE EARNEST MONEY PRIOR TO FILING SUIT. 
The contractual language at issue in this case reads, "If Buyer defaults, Seller may 
elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and 
sue Buyer to specifically enforce this contract or pursue other remedies available at law." 
R. 54. Thus, a buyer presented with this contract would clearly understand that if he or 
she signed the contract, he or she would be risking more than the earnest money. Instead, 
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the buyer would be risking either the earnest money or being forced to purchase the 
property, depending on what the seller chose to do. Public policy would favor allowing 
the seller to make that decision since the parties to the contracted expected the seller to do 
so. 
The next question is, when does the seller make that decision. The contractual 
language does not require return of the earnest money before filing suit. The contractual 
language contains two clauses connected by the word "and." The first clause is "return 
it" while the second clause is "sue buyer to specifically enforce this contract or pursue 
other remedies available at law." In this context, the word "and" states two conditions 
that must be satisfied should the second option be chosen by the seller. The contract 
does not mandate the order in which the two clauses must occur. For example, the 
phrases, "you must take trigonometry and geometry before calculus" is equivalent to the 
phrase, "you must take geometry and trigonometry before calculus." The mere use of the 
word "and" does not indicate that the events did or must occur in a particular order. 
In this case, the contract does not contain the word "then" or "after" or other 
similar language. Instead, it only contains the use of the word "and." Thus, the plain 
language of the contract does not require one event to occur before the other. Instead, it 
only requires both events to occur sometime before the seller actually obtains the specific 
performance. 
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Further, the contract contains the word "sue." If that word is to be interpreted as 
argued by the defendants, it should have used the word "file" or "commence." By using 
the word sue, the contract means that the earnest money must be returned before 
judgment. 
C. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS ALLOWING THIS CASE TO GO 
FORWARD ON THE MERITS. 
Public policy does not support a strict rule requiring return of the earnest money 
prior to the instant the complaint is filed at the court house. In our legal system, cases 
often take months or even years to come to trial. During that time, the financial or other 
condition of the parties may change, thus necessitating a change in the relief sought. For 
this, and other reasons, our laws have been designed to give parties to litigation some 
flexibility. For example, parties are allowed to plead alternative and inconsistent causes 
of action. Another example may be a plaintiff who files a complaint and then amends it 
prior to serving the adverse party. In fact, a plaintiff may actually file a complaint, 
dismiss it without prejudice and refile it. 
Public policy also favors allowing parties to enforce valid contracts. In this case, 
the buyers agreed to purchase the home. Public policy favors forcing the defendants to 
live up to their contractual obligations. 
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For the reasons stated above, public policy must also favor allowing a party to 
return earnest money after the complaint is filed. That is especially true in a case like this 
where the defendants waived the defense, as will be discussed below. 
A purchaser might argue that it is unfair to allow the seller to proceed with a 
lawsuit while holding the earnest money. The long line of cases cited above make it clear 
that Utah courts will not allow a seller to do so. However, under our legal system, a 
purchaser is not without remedy. A purchaser may raise an affirmative defense in his 
answer, he may write a letter requesting return of the earnest money, or he may file a 
motion to dismiss. Under these circumstances, the seller would then clearly understand 
his legal obligations and would be able to exercise a conscious and knowing decision. On 
the other hand, if this court creates a hard and fast rule requiring return of the earnest 
money prior to filing suit, many cases will end up being thrown out on nothing more than 
a technicality. In reply, a purchaser might argue that once this court rules, the law will be 
established one way or the other and it won't make any difference. If this court adopts 
the position espoused by the defendants, however, this court will simply create a 
malpractice trap for attorneys and an unpleasant surprise for pro se plaintiffs. Our courts 
should not sanction that type of approach to these cases. 
This case should be given the same treatment as other election of remedy cases 
where the plaintiff is allowed to make the election after filing suit. For example, in 
Uniform Real Estate Purchase Contract cases, the seller has been allowed to file 
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inconsistent pleadings and then make the election after the defendant files a motion to 
dismiss for failing to make the election. Midvale Motors. Inc. v. Saunders. 432 P.2d 37, 39 
(Utah 1967) ( "[buyers] had a right during the course of the litigation to demand such an election 
but not to make such an election on behalf of Midvale."); Rogers v. United Western Minerals 
Company, 326 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1958) (election made at pretrial was timely). 
Thus, this court should hold that a seller of real property may return the earnest 
money after filing suit but must return it when the defendant requests the plaintiff to make 
an election of remedies. 
II. 
THE DEFENSE OF FAILURE TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY CAN BE 
WAIVED 
The trial court found that the defendants had waived the defense of failure to 
return the earnest money both by failing to raise it in a timely manner, by stipulation and 
by accepting return of the earnest money. The judge then held, however, that the defense 
could not be waived as a matter of law. That ruling is incorrect. 
U.R.C.P. 8 required the defendants to raise the defense of failure to return the 
earnest money as an affirmative defense in their answer. U.R.C.P. 12(h) states that 
affirmative defenses which are not timely raised are waived. Because the defendants 
failed to raise the defense in their answer, they waived it. 
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Further, the defendants expressly waived the defense by stipulation. Finally, by 
accepting return of the earnest money, they waived the defense. 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a ^ technical rule of procedure " Angelos v. 
First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983) (case dealing with an election of 
remedies between a bank and the person who forged several checks). In Palmer v. Haves, 892 
P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1995), the plaintiff attempted to distinguish earnest money REPC cases 
from other election of remedies cases. The court held that "the Andreasen line of cases [return of 
earnest money/election of remedy line of cases] does not conflict with Angelos. The Andreasen 
line does not dispute the fact that election of remedies is a procedural rule; the cases simply 
define the procedure for electing remedies." Palmer at 1062. Thus, defense of failure to return 
earnest money is a technical rule of procedure and is an affirmative defense that can be waived. 
Costello v. Kasteler. 324 P.2 772 (Utah 1958). 
Thus, the trial court was incorrect in holding that the affirmative defense of failure to 
return the earnest money could not be waived. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CASE WITH 
PREJUDICE 
As stated above, the case should not have been dismissed. In the alternative, 
however, if this court finds that it should have been dismissed, the case should have been 
dismissed without prejudice. 
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In Bunting Tractor Co.. Inc. v. Emmett D. Ford Contractors. Inc.. 272 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1954); Kemper v. Clarite Battery. Inc.. 272 P.2d 194 (Utah 1954), the plaintiff was 
required by rule to post a bond within 30 days of demand by the defendant. The plaintiff 
failed to post the bond within 30 days as required by rule. If the plaintiff failed to 
comply, the rule stated that the court "shall dismiss the action " Bunting at 277. The 
plaintiff did post the bond prior to the motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the case 
with prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that it is "the duty of the court to 
make such order, not inconsistent with law, as will effectuate justice." Bunting at 277. 
The court went on to state that under Utah law that "deviation from form and procedure 
shall not work a forfeiture of substantive rights in the absence of prejudice to the 
opposing party." Bunting at 277. Finally, the Court stated that it the "purpose of the 
courts to afford litigants every reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits of their 
cases." Bunting at 277. For these reasons, the trial court was overruled and the dismissal 
was made without prejudice. 
The case at bar is very similar. This case was dismissed because the plaintiffs 
failed to return the earnest money prior to filing suit. The trial court did not make a 
decision on the merits. Further, the earnest money had been returned prior to the filing of 
the motion to dismiss. For these reasons, if the trial court was proper in dismissing the 
case, it should have dismissed it without prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
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For the reasons stated above, the appellants (plaintiffs) respectfully request this 
Court to overturn the order of the trial court dated November 25. 2000 and to remand this 
case to the trial court with instructions that the trial court deny the motion to dismiss and 
hear this case on its merits. Further, the appellants request their costs on appeal. 
DATED this ^7 /Kday of May, 2001. 
Nelson Abbott 
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ADDENDUM A 
RULE 12, U.R.C.P. 
39 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days 
after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise 
expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial 
on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after 
notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made b}' motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by farther pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point 
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted 
and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order 
or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
u lAH JKUJULb UF CIVIL PROCEDURE 40 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him 
the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to 
him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all 
defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he 
does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made 
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. U.R C.P 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
jr Answers to interrogatories. 
\-—Rights of opposing party. 
3&>tion for more definite statement. 
^ B i l l of particulars. 
—Criteria. 
—Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
—Purpose. 
Delay 
Obtaining evidence 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
—Explained. 
—Habeas corpus. 
—Improper. 
—Standard. 
—Standard of review. 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
—Forum-selection clause m contract. 
Presentation of defenses. 
—How presented. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Divorce. 
Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted 
General and special appearances 
Statute of frauds. 
Venue. 
—When presented. 
Amended answer. 
ADDENDUM B 
RULE 8, U.R.C.P. 
23 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 
the prayer does not limit the relief which the tdon, court could restore jury findings under 
court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
-j. . - within ten days. National Farmers' Union 
—iNew trial. Property & Cas. Co. v Thompson. 4 Utah 2d 7, 
Particularization. 286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 il955). 
Only purpose for requiring particularization 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform Orders. 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought, where defendant filed affi- —Correction. 
davit with motions setting forth theories, and Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, fleeted judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
356 P.2d 275 (I960'. court, judge could correct order on his own 
motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 
—Setting aside conditional order. ^ g 299 P.2d 827 U956). 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
jury and entered conditional order granting Utah 387, 259 R2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. Heirs 
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc- of BrafTet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61AAm. Jur. 2d A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Pleading §§ 31 et seq., 665. Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as 
C.J.S. —60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § l e t affected by opponent's motion ffflfcras* 
seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et judgment, judgment on the pleafcjngs, or di-
seq., 211 et seq.
 r e c t e d verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or 
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good 
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make 
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he 
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert 
all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set 
forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat 
the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
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(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading 
to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative 
and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not 
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he 
has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set 
forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. —Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, U.R.C.R 15. 
•^ •^iSrT&tration, § 78-3 la-1 et seq. 
^^jQtfmparative negligence, § 78-27-38. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.R 13. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.R 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§ 21-1-5, 78-6-14. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.R 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84. 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, 
U.R.C.R 12(d). 
Interpleader, U.R.C.R 22. 
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24. 
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.R 10(b). 
One form of action, U.R.C.R 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.R 7(a). 
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A-9-
203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished, U.R.C.R 65B(a). 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
Statute of frauds, investment securities, 
§ 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial Code, 
personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.R 14. 
Time for answer, U.R.C.R 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affirmative defenses. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
Pleading. 
Time limitation. 
—Avoidance. 
—Consent. 
—Election of remedies. 
—Estoppel. 
Failure to plead. 
—Failure of consideration. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
—Failure to plead. 
Affidavit opposing summary judgment. 
Denial. 
Notice and opportunity. 
Permissive amendment. 
Waiver of defense. 
—Fraud. 
Necessary allegations. 
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act. 
—Mitigation of damages. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Pleading. 
—Statute of limitations. 
Applicability to plaintiffs. 
Pleading. 
Waiver. 
—Waiver. 
Claims for relief. 
—Amendment of pleading. 
—Attorney fees. 
—Essential allegations. 
Alienation of affections. 
—Request for alternative relief. 
—Sufficiency of complaint. 
Attachment of exhibit. 
Found not sufficient. 
Found sufficient. 
Liberal construction. 
Consistency. 
—Double recovery. 
ADDENDUM C 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMiTH, Clerk 
/l-79~r/7>/^^ Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL C. McKEON and LISA McKEON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH CRUMP and AMY S. CRUMP, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 990404250 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
District Court Judge 
This matter came before the above-entitled court on September 12, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. 
for hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs having presented their case and 
having rested. Plaintiffs were represented by Nelson Abbott; and Defendants were represented by 
Richard D. Bradford. The court, having heard argument on the Motion, being fully appraised and 
having fully considered this matter, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law, the court hereby enters the following order. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants shall return the $2,500.00 Earnest Money to Plaintiffs as a set-off. 
3. Defendants are awarded reasonable and necessary costs and reasonable attorney fees as 
follows: 
Attorney fees through September 12, 2000 
Costs and disbursements 
Less credit for Earnest Money Return 
TOTAL REMAINING JUDGMENT 
$4,908.75 
1,343.03 
(2.500 00) 
53,751.78 
together with after-accruing attorneys fees and costs, as may be shown. 
DATED this *2^< day of November, 2000. 
BY THE 
Honorable Fred^ iD. Howard 
/District Couirfudge 
'Jd 439 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that ataie and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, on this ^?V<iay of November, 2000: 
Richard D. Bradford 
BRADFORD & BRADY, PC . 
389 North University Avenue 
Provo,UT 84601 
Nelson Abbott 
ABBOTT, SPENCER & SMITH, LLC 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, UT 84601 
Deputy Clerk 
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" . ED 
Fount' ••. .~.ic.3' District Court 
of Utah Counn State of Utah 
CAPj^A . =,/->-• cierk 
-~^2gz£%lJUfe>. Ooputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAMEL C. McKEON and LISA McKEON, j 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH CRUMP and AMY S. CRUMP, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 990404250 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
District Court Judge 
This matter came before the above-entitled court on September 12, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. 
for hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs having presented their case and 
having rested. Nelson Abbott appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, and Richard D Bradford appeared 
on behalf of Defendants. Plaintiff Dan McKeon and Defendant Amy Crump were also present. 
The court heard argument on the Motion, and being fully apprized and having fully considered 
this matter, the court now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This is a suit for specific performance and damages under a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. 
2. On, or about, October 25, 1999, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
for the sale of Plaintiffs5 home to Defendants. Incident to the contract, Defendants paid 
Plaintiffs $2,500 00 Earnest Money. 
47i 
3. Defendants never purchased Plaintiffs' home. 
4. On December 2, 1999, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendants Plaintiffs did not 
return the Earnest Money to Defendants prior to filing suit or pursuing any other remedy 
5. On December 6, 1999, Defendants gave notice that they would not go through with the 
purchase and demanded return of the Earnest Money 
6. On March 6, 2000, Defendants filed an answer Defendants did not raise the failure to 
return the Earnest Money as an affirmative defense in their answer 
7. On April 18, 2000, counsel for the parties entered into a stipulation Part of the 
stipulation was that Defendants would waive all objections to the timeliness of the return 
of the Earnest Money. 
8. On May 19, 2000, Plaintiffs returned the Earnest Money, twenty-five hundred dollars 
($2,500), to Defendants and Defendants accepted the money 
9. Plaintiffs returned the Earnest Money in an attempt to revive or preserve their claim for 
specific performance. 
10. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the following provision providing for return 
of the Earnest Money "If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce 
this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law " Paragraph 16 
11. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the following provision providing for attorney 
fees "In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this contract, the 
2 
470 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees" Paragraph 17 1 
12 Plaintiffs presented their case at trial on June 6, 2000, and August 29, 2000 Plaintiffs 
rested their case on August 29, 2000 
13 At the close of Plaintiffs case, Defendants made a motion to dismiss based upon Plaintiffs' 
failure to return Defendants' Earnest Money before filing suit 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
14 The Real Estate Purchase Contract required Plaintiffs to return the Earnest Money prior to 
filing suit 
15 Plaintiffs failed to return the Earnest Money prior to filing suit 
16 The failure to return the Earnest Money is an affirmative defense 
17 U R C P 1 2 states that affirmative defenses are waived if not raised in the answer 
18 Notwithstanding the affirmative defense rule, the progeny of Utah cases dealing 
specifically with the return of Earnest Money under similar contract cases (cited in 
Defendants' Memorandum m Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and starting with 
Andreaseri) compel this court to find that Utah law requires the return of the Earnest 
Money prior to filing suit and that such defense may not be waived by failing to raise it in 
the answer or through stipulation of the parties Therefore, the issue of whether the 
defense was waived, by failing to raise it in the answer or through stipulation, is moot 
19 Because the defense cannot be waived, by the terms of the parties' contract, Plaintiffs have 
3 
A 
by retaining Defendants' Earnest Money, elected their contract remedy. As such, 
Plaintiffs are precluded from asserting a cause of action for specific performance and 
damages. 
20. Defendants could have raised their defense without waiting until the close of Plaintiffs' 
case. 
21. By failing to timely raise the defense in their answer and by stipulating to waive it, 
Defendants unnecessarily increased the costs of suit, attorney fees and the amount of 
judicial resources expended in this action. 
22. As set forth in its Ruling Re: Attorney Fees and Costs, the court finds that Defendants' 
reasonable and necessary attorney fees are $4,908.75 with costs of $1,343.03. The court 
finds that it is just and proper that Defendants be awarded said fees and costs. 
23. In exercising its equitable powers, the court finds that Defendants are to return the 
$2,500.00 Earnest Money to Plaintiffs, which Plaintiffs had returned to Defendants in an 
attempt to revive or preserve their claim for specific performance. 
DATED th i s^^Jdav of November, 2000. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, on this Cffi^day of November, 2000: 
Richard D. Bradford 
BRADFORD & BRADY, P.C. 
389 North University Avenue 
Provo,UT 84601 
Nelson Abbott 
ABBOTT, SPENCER & SMITH, LLC 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, UT 84601 
By JjJ&jOa*^ 
Deputy Clerk 
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